乔治•索罗斯(George Soros)为英国《金融时报》撰稿 2008年1月23日 星期三
当前的金融危机是由美国住宅市场泡沫促成的。从某些方面来说，这一金融危机与第二次世界大战结束后每隔4年至10年爆发的其它危机有相似之处。
然而，在这些金融危机之间，存在着本质的不同。当前的危机标志信贷扩张时代的终结，这个时代是建立在作为全球储备货币的美元基础上的。其它周期性危机则是规模较大的繁荣-萧条过程中的组成部分。当前的金融危机则是一轮超级繁荣周期的顶峰，此轮周期已持续了60多年。
繁 荣-萧条周期通常围绕着信贷状况循环出现，同时始终会涉及到一种偏见或误解。这通常是未能认识到贷款意愿和抵押品价值之间存在一种反身 （reflexive）、循环的关系。如果容易获得信贷，就带来了需求，而这种需求推高了房地产价值；反过来，这种情况又增加了可获得信贷的数量。当人们 购买房产，并期待能够从抵押贷款再融资中获利，泡沫便由此产生。近年来，美国住宅市场繁荣就是一个佐证。而持续60年的超级繁荣，则是一个更为复杂的例子.
每当信贷扩张遇到麻烦时，金融当局都采取了干预措施，（向市场）注入流动性，并寻找其它途径，刺激经济增长。这就造就了一个非对称激励体系，也被称之为道德 风险，它推动了信贷越来越强劲的扩张。这一体系是如此成功，以至于人们开始相信前美国总统罗纳德•里根(Ronald Reagan)所说的“市场的魔术”——而我则称之为“市场原教旨主义”(market fundamentalism)。原教旨主义者认为，市场会趋于平衡，而允许市场参与者追寻自身利益，将最有利于共同的利益。这显然是一种误解，因为使金 融市场免于崩盘的并非市场本身，而是当局的干预。不过，市场原教旨主义上世纪80年代开始成为占据主宰地位的思维方式，当时金融市场刚开始全球化，美国则 开始出现经常账户赤字。全球化使美国可以吸取全球其它地区的储蓄，并消费高出自身产出的物品。2006年，美国经常账户赤字达到了其国内生 产总值(GDP)的6.2%。通过推出越来越复杂的产品和更为慷慨的条件，金融市场鼓励消费者借贷。每当全球金融系统面临危险之际，金融当局就出手干预， 起到了推波助澜的作用。1980年以来，监管不断放宽，甚至到了名存实亡的地步。
当新产品的复杂程度到了监管当局无法计算风险，并开始依赖银行自身的风险管理手段时，此轮超级繁荣周期失去了控制。同样，评级机构也依赖合成产品发明者提供的信息。这是一种令人震惊的不负责任。
任 何可能出问题的地方都出了问题。开始时，出现在次级抵押贷款上的问题，蔓延到了债务抵押债券(collateralised debt obligations)，危及了市政及抵押担保保险公司和再保险公司，并可能危及规模数万亿美元的信贷违约掉期市场。投资银行对杠杆收购的参与成为了负 债。市场中立的对冲基金后来不再中立，不得不结清头寸。有资产担保的商业票据市场陷入停顿，各银行为将抵押贷款移至资产负债表外而建立的特殊投资工具 (special investment vehicles)，也不再能够获得外部融资。最后一击出现在作为金融体系核心的银行间借贷中断之际，中断的原因是各家银行不得不保护自己的资源，不再信 任对方。各国央行不得不注入数额空前巨大的资金，围绕前所未有的证券种类，为数量空前的金融机构提供信贷。这使此次危机进一步加剧，超过了二战以来的所有 危机。
信贷扩张必然继之以一个信贷紧缩时期，因为一些新信贷工具和做法不够健全，也难以持续。全球其它地区不愿累积额外的美元储备，这限制 了金融当局刺激经济的能力。直到最近，投资者们一直指望美联储(Federal Reserve)会尽其所能来避免经济衰退，因为在以往（类似）情况下美联储就是这样做的。如今，他们将被迫认识到，美联储无法再这样做了。在石油、食品 及其它大宗商品价格坚挺，同时人民币升值略有提速的情况下，美联储也要担心通货膨胀。如果联邦基金利率降至某一特定点位以下，美元将再度面临压力，而长期 （美国）国债的收益率则必将上升。那个点位究竟在何处，目前不可能作出判断。当触及这一点位时，美联储刺激经济的能力也就耗尽了。
尽管从目前情况看，发达国家出现经济衰退或多或少是在所难免的，但中国、印度和一些产油国仍在强劲增长。因此，当前的金融危机不太可能导致一场全球性的衰退，而是一次对全球经济的根本性调整。在这一调整过程中，美国将相对衰落，而中国和其它发展中国家将崛起。
但危险在于由此产生的政治紧张局势，其中包括美国实施保护主义，可能使全球经济陷入混乱，并将这个世界拖入衰退乃至更糟糕的境地。
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THE WORST MARKET CRISIS IN 60 YEARS
The current financial crisis was precipitated by a bubble in the US housing market. In some ways it resembles other crises that have occurred since the end of the second world war at intervals ranging from four to 10 years.
However, there is a profound difference: the current crisis marks the end of an era of credit expansion based on the dollar as the international reserve currency. The periodic crises were part of a larger boom-bust process. The current crisis is the culmination of a super-boom that has lasted for more than 60 years.
Boom-bust processes usually revolve around credit and always involve a bias or misconception. This is usually a failure to recognise a reflexive, circular connection between the willingness to lend and the value of the collateral. Ease of credit generates demand that pushes up the value of property, which in turn increases the amount of credit available. A bubble starts when people buy houses in the expectation that they can refinance their mortgages at a profit. The recent US housing boom is a case in point. The 60-year super-boom is a more complicated case.
Every time the credit expansion ran into trouble the financial authorities intervened, injecting liquidity and finding other ways to stimulate the economy. That created a system of asymmetric incentives also known as moral hazard, which encouraged ever greater credit expansion. The system was so successful that people came to believe in what former US president Ronald Reagan called the magic of the marketplace and I call market fundamentalism. Fundamentalists believe that markets tend towards equilibrium and the common interest is best served by allowing participants to pursue their self-interest. It is an obvious misconception, because it was the intervention of the authorities that prevented financial markets from breaking down, not the markets themselves. Nevertheless, market fundamentalism emerged as the dominant ideology in the 1980s, when financial markets started to become globalised and the US started to run a current account deficit.
Globalisation allowed the US to suck up the savings of the rest of the world and consume more than it produced. The US current account deficit reached 6.2 per cent of gross national product in 2006. The financial markets encouraged consumers to borrow by introducing ever more sophisticated instruments and more generous terms. The authorities aided and abetted the process by intervening whenever the global financial system was at risk. Since 1980, regulations have been progressively relaxed until they have practically disappeared.
The super-boom got out of hand when the new products became so complicated that the authorities could no longer calculate the risks and started relying on the risk management methods of the banks themselves. Similarly, the rating agencies relied on the information provided by the originators of synthetic products. It was a shocking abdication of responsibility.
Everything that could go wrong did. What started with subprime mortgages spread to all collateralised debt obligations, endangered municipal and mortgage insurance and reinsurance companies and threatened to unravel the multi-trillion-dollar credit default swap market. Investment banks’ commitments to leveraged buyouts became liabilities. Market-neutral hedge funds turned out not to be market-neutral and had to be unwound. The asset-backed commercial paper market came to a standstill and the special investment vehicles set up by banks to get mortgages off their balance sheets could no longer get outside financing. The final blow came when interbank lending, which is at the heart of the financial system, was disrupted because banks had to husband their resources and could not trust their counterparties. The central banks had to inject an unprecedented amount of money and extend credit on an unprecedented range of securities to a broader range of institutions than ever before. That made the crisis more severe than any since the second world war.
Credit expansion must now be followed by a period of contraction, because some of the new credit instruments and practices are unsound and unsustainable. The ability of the financial authorities to stimulate the economy is constrained by the unwillingness of the rest of the world to accumulate additional dollar reserves. Until recently, investors were hoping that the US Federal Reserve would do whatever it takes to avoid a recession, because that is what it did on previous occasions. Now they will have to realise that the Fed may no longer be in a position to do so. With oil, food and other commodities firm, and the renminbi appreciating somewhat faster, the Fed also has to worry about inflation. If federal funds were lowered beyond a certain point, the dollar would come under renewed pressure and long-term bonds would actually go up in yield. Where that point is, is impossible to determine. When it is reached, the ability of the Fed to stimulate the economy comes to an end.
Although a recession in the developed world is now more or less inevitable, China, India and some of the oil-producing countries are in a very strong countertrend. So, the current financial crisis is less likely to cause a global recession than a radical realignment of the global economy, with a relative decline of the US and the rise of China and other countries in the developing world.
The danger is that the resulting political tensions, including US protectionism, may disrupt the global economy and plunge the world into recession or worse.
1、北京图书大厦。西单广场东侧，民航大厦西侧，西长安街路北。 也许是芴亡寂清孤陋寡闻，不过北京图书大厦的确是迄今为止在全国见过的最大的一家书店。在上海生活过的朋友曾强调，上海书城规模远 比北京图书大厦更大，但经芴亡寂清2004年实地观察，上海书城规模还是小于北京图书大厦，虽有七层，但每层容量较小，不似北京图书大厦每一层都“视野开 阔”。
暢銷作家吳淡如新書涉嫌抄襲，資深新聞人蔡祐吉的
中國時報丁文玲／台北報導2008.01.09
最近看了一本十分搞笑的轻松小品，称为《爱情课本》，出乎我的预料，原来作者就是万挠男孩的同一作者。
